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INTRODUCTION
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit recently
held in Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of Los Angeles' that
a city had violated the first amendment of the U.S. Constitution by
limiting cable television franchises in a particular region to a single
company.2 Preferred Communications (PCI), a corporation organized
for the purpose of operating a cable television system in the South
Central District of Los Angeles, was denied a franchise by the city
for failure to participate in the franchise auction process.' The city
refused to permit PCI to operate a cable television system in the South
Central District under any circumstances.4 PCI alleged the franchise
process violated rights of access to a public forum under the first
amendment. In addition, PCI claimed the actions of the city were
improper under the Sherman Antitrust Act. The district court denied
both claims.5 The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals affirmed the holding
of the district court that the action of the city did not violate anti-
trust laws.6 The appellate court reversed on the constitutional issue,
however, and held the cable television franchising process used by
the city violated the first amendment.
7
1. 754 F.2d 1396 (9th Cir. 1985), cert. granted, - U.S. - (U.S. Nov. 12, 1985)
(No. 85-390).
2. Preferred Communications, Inc., v. City of Los Angeles, 754 F.2d 1396, 1401-02; see
infra note 27 and accompanying text.
3. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
4. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401.
5. The action was dismissed for failure to state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
Id. at 1399. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 12(b)(6). The standard of review required the appellate court
to accept all factual and material allegations of PCI as true and to uphold the dismissal only
if no set of facts could support the claim. 754 F.2d at 1399 (quoting Conley v. Gibson, 355
U.S. 41, 45-46 (1957)).
6. The court noted that states are immune from liability under the Sherman Act. Prefer-
red Communications, 754 F.2d at 1411 (citing Parker v. Brown, 317 U.S. 341 (1943)).
7. Id. at 1401-02.
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Part I of this note sets forth the facts of the case and the decision
of the court.8 Part II discusses the legal background of the first amend-
ment issue.9 Special focus will be placed on the application of the
recent ruling of the United States Supreme Court in Members of the
City Council of the City of Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent.II
Part III examines the legal ramifications of the ruling by addressing
the extent to which a city may regulate cable television franchises.
In addition, the criteria a city should apply in limiting the number
of franchises will be examined."
I. THE CASE
A. The Facts
For many years, public utilities throughout California dedicated
surplus space on utility poles for cable television use.' In 1984, the
California Legislature enacted a statute that declared cable television
use of public utility support structures was in the public interest.' 3
PCI proposed to serve the South Central District of Los Angeles by
attaching television cables to existing utility poles and conduits owned
by Pacific Telephone and Telegraph Company (Pacific Telephone) and
the Los Angeles Department of Water and Power (DWP).' 4 Pacific
Telephone and DWP refused to negotiate with PCI unless PCI
obtained a cable television franchise from the city.' 5 Certain formalities
were required to obtain a franchise.'
6
The City of Los Angeles required cable television franchise can-
didates to participate in an auction process. Candidates were required
8. See infra notes 12-59 and accompanying text.
9. See infra notes 60-105 and accompanying text.
10. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
11. See infra notes 106-124 and accompanying text.
12. See infra note 13 and accompanying text.
13. 1980 Cal. Stat. c. 646, §1, at 1811 (enacting CAL. PUB. UTIL. CODE §767.5(b)).
The Legislature finds and declares that public utilities have dedicated a portion of
such support structures to cable television corporations for pole attachments in that
public utilities have made available, through a course of conduct covering many years,
surplus space and excess capacity on and in their support structures for use by cable
television corporations for pole attachments, and that the provision by such public
utilities of surplus space and excess capacity for such pole attachments is a public
utility service delivered by public utilities to cable television corporations. The
Legislature further finds and declares that it is in the interests of the people of Califor-
nia for public utilities to continue to make available such surplus space and excess
capacity for use by cable television corporations.
CAL. PuB. UnT. CODE §767.5(b).
14. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1400.
15. Id.
16. See infra note 17 and accompanying text.
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to submit to a variety of stringent conditions including the payment
of specified fees and agreement to certain operating procedures. 7 After
submission of bids by competing cable television companies, the city
selected the one candidate deemed to be best qualified for each
geographical area.' 8 PCI refused to participate in the bidding process
and was therefore denied permission to operate a cable television system
in the South Central District.'
9
B. The Opinion
PCI claimed the city could neither choose which cable providers
may use public utility facilities, nor condition that use on requirements
imposed by the city. 20 PCI further asserted public utility poles were
a public forum by government designation, and access to the poles
was therefore protected by the first amendment. 2' PCI also claimed
that sufficient space on the utility poles was available to accommodate
more than a single cable television system.22 The city contended that
the scarcity of available space on public utility structures,23 the
monopolistic nature of the cable television medium,2" and the disrup-
tion of public property from installation and maintenance of a cable
17. The franchise of cable television systems has been authorized by the California
Legislature. CAL. Gov. CODE §53066. The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals in Preferred Com-
munications outlined the requirements imposed by the City of Los Angeles for cable television
franchises. The city requires bidders to pay a $10,000 filing fee, a $500 good faith deposit,
and up to $60,000 in reimbursement expenses for the cost of holding the auction. Preferred
Communications, 754 F.2d at 1400. Bidders must provide the city with a detailed proposal
outlining intended operations for the succeeding nine years. Id. In addition, bidders must
demonstrate a sound financial base, sound business plans, proper character qualifications, and
business experience. Id. Bidders must also agree to pay the city a percentage of gross annual
revenues. Id. Bidders must further agree to provide at least fifty-two channels, interactive two-
way service, two leased channels, two channels for educational purposes, two channels for use
by the city, and two channels for use by the general public. Id. Programming staff and facilities
must be provided for use by the general public without compensation. Id. Bidders must also
agree to provide portable production facilities and permit free city use of all poles, towers,
ducts and antennas. Id. at 1401. Potential cable operators must also agree to relinquish control
over pricing and customer relations to the city. Id. The operator must form a cable franchise
authority board subject to city control. Id. Finally, the city reserves the right to inspect cable
operations at any time, and requires a waiver of any right to recover damages arising from
the franchise or enforcement. Id. at 1401-02.
18. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401. No criteria are stated for determining
which of the bidders would best serve each geographical area. See id.
19. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401.
20. Id.
21. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
22. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404.
23. Id. at 1402. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying text.
24. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1402. See infra notes 41-44 and accompanying
text.
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system 5 justified restriction of access to a single cable television com-
pany.2
6
The appellate court addressed the issue as one of physical space.
Specifically, the question was whether the city could allow only one
cable television franchise to operate when the system could physically
accommodate more.27 Because the case was dismissed below for failure
to state a claim upon which relief could be granted, the court accepted
the allegations of PCI as true.28 PCI alleged that the system could
accommodate more than one cable operator.2 9 The court therefore
concluded that PCI had stated a claim."
The decision of the court was based upon four considerations. First,
the court examined the physical scarcity rule applied to the broad-
casting industry.3 Second, government regulation of natural
monopolies was addressed.3 2 Third, the court examined the disrup-
tive impact of cable television on public resources.33 Finally, the court
discussed the applicability of the public forum doctrine. All four
considerations will be addressed, beginning with the physical scarcity
doctrine as applied to regulation of television broadcasting.35
1. Cable Television and Broadcasting Distinguished
Regulation of the broadcasting medium is justified by the physical
scarcity of radio waves.36 The court in Preferred Communications
25. Preferred Communications, 754, F.2d at 1402. See infra notes 45-50 and accompany-
ing text.
26. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1402.
27. The court framed the issue as follows:
Can the City, consistent with the first amendment, limit access by means of an auction
to a given region of the City to a single cable television company, when the public
utility facilities and other public property in that region necessary to the installation
and operation of a cable television system are physically capable of accommodating
more than one system?
Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1401.
28. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1399. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
29. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404.
30. Id. at 1399. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
31. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403-04.
32. Id. at 1404-05.
33. Id. at 1405-07.
34. Id. at 1407-09.
35. The court briefly noted that cable television enjoys some first amendment protection.
Id. at 1403. The problem to be addressed involved the application of that protection to the
issues raised in Preferred Communications. Id.
36. Id. at 1403. See National Broadcasting Company v. U.S., 319 U.S. 190, 226-27 (1943)
(government may impose licensing requirements on television broadcasting companies because
the radio medium, by its nature, is not available to all); Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo
Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1984) (government may regulate broadcasting medium
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declined to apply the standards of government regulation of broad-
casting to regulation of cable television companies.37 Each medium
of expression must be assessed for first amendment purposes by stan-
dards suited to that particular medium.38 Regulation of cable televi-
sion under the regulatory standards of broadcasting would require
a determination of the availability of space on utility support struc-
tures in the South Central District of Los Angeles.39 Because the city
failed to assert a physical scarcity or make a determination of the
availability of space, the physical scarcity doctrine of regulation of
broadcasting was not a valid basis to regulate cable television."0
2. Natural Monopoly
The court of appeals dismissed the contention of the city that because
cable television enjoys a monopoly in geographical areas of distribu-
tion, government regulation is justified." The city contended that an
absence of business competition with other cable companies allowed
the government to regulate access to public utility facilities. "2 The court
because physical scarcity of radio waves renders electromagnetic spectrum incapable of carry-
ing the messages of all who wish to use the medium).
37. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1403. Several courts have applied the broad-
casting regulation standard to governmental regulation of cable television. See, e.g., Community
Communications Co. v. City of Boulder, 660 F.2d 1370, 1378-79 (10th Cir. 1981) (inherent
limitations of broadcasting medium do not justify government regulation of cable television
on the basis of economic scarcity); Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir.
1968) (government regulation of microwave antenna systems has same constitutional status as
regulation of transmission of radio signals although radio waves are not used); Berkshire Cable-
vision of Rhode Island v. Burke 571 F. Supp. 976, 983-88 (D.R.I. 1983) (interest in preventing
monopolization of cable television time allowed government to require dedication of channels
for public access).
38. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404; Southeastern Promotions v. Conrad,
420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
39. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404.
40. Id. The court assumed that sufficient physical space existed on utility structures to
accommodate more than one franchise. Id. See supra note 5 and accompanying text. The court
therefore expressly reserved judgment regarding how a city might appropriately allocate access
among competing cable systems when utility structures are shown to be incapable of accom-
modating all companies seeking access. Id.
41. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404-05. Cf. Miami Herald Publishing Co.
v. Tornillo, 418 U.S. 241 (1974). The monopolistic nature of an enterprise that results from
a natural absence of competition justifies government regulation of the enterprise. Preferred
Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404-05. In Tornillo, however, the Supreme Court declined to
permit government regulation of access to newspaper space although a lack of competition
made entry into newspaper markets difficult. Tornillo, 418 U.S. at 249-58. The Court held
that states could not grant political candidates a right to equal space to reply to criticism in
newspapers, even though most newspapers enjoyed monopolies in their geographical areas of
distribution. Id.
42. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404. See supra note 41 and accompanying text.
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assumed the truth of the allegation of PCI, however, that competi-
tion for cable services in Los Angeles was economically feasible.43
Furthermore, the court noted that the auction process of the city
limited franchises to a single company and created the very monopoly
that the city used to justify regulation of the cable medium. The court
concluded, therefore, that the allegation of natural monopoly was not
an adequate ground for dismissing the claim of PCI."I
3. Disruption of Public Resources
Another asserted purpose of the franchising process was to control
disruption of the public domain."' The court attacked the argument
of the city by applying the test for reasonableness of government
regulation of first amendment privileges articulated by the Supreme
Court in United States v. O'Brien.4 6 Government regulation of free
speech is reasonable if the restrictions are no greater than necessary
to advance an important or substantial government interest, and the
regulation is unrelated to the suppression of free expression."7 Although
the city had a valid interest in avoiding disruption of public prop-
erty, that interest was outweighed by first amendment concerns.48
Secondly, the franchising process created a serious risk of discrimina-
tion on the basis of content or views expressed in programming.49
The court, therefore, rejected disruption of public resources as a basis
for regulation under the facts in Preferred Communications.5"
4. The Public Forum Doctrine
Because the public forum doctrine focuses on the nature and
43. Id. at 1405. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
44. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404.
45. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1405. Some government regulation is justified
because cable television requires the use of public facilities. Id. Governmental interest in public
safety and maintenance of thoroughfares is a basis for governmental regulation. Id.; Com-
munity Communications, 660 F.2d at 1377-78.
46. See United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968).
[A] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is within the constitutional
power of the government; if it furthers an important or substantial governmental
interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression of free expres-
sion; and if the incidental restriction on alleged first amendment freedoms is no greater
than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.
Id. at 377.
47. Id. at 377.
48. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406.
49. Id.
50. Id.
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character of public property used for first amendment expression, the
doctrine was applicable in this case.' The court found that utility
poles and conduits do not constitute a traditional public forum.52 The
Ninth Circuit therefore applied the Supreme Court ruling in Perry
Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Association. 3 In
Perry, the Court held that states could reserve nontraditional forums
for their intended purpose." In Preferred Communications, the issue
was narrowed to whether the manner of first amendment expression
was fundamentally incompatible with the normal activity of the par-
ticular public property involved in the case." The court allowed the
use of utility facilities for first amendment expression via the cable
medium because the use was compatible with the normal utility com-
pany activity of delivering electrical power and telephone service. 56
The suspension of television cables was consistent with the use of
public utility poles to support telephone and power lines.5 Upon con-
cluding that utility structures were a type of nontraditional. forum,
the court held that the city could promulgate reasonable time, place
and manner regulations." The city could not, however, limit access
to the forum to a single cable television company under the facts
alleged.5 9
51. Id. at 1407 (citing Perry Education Assn. v. Perry Local Educators' Assn., 460 U.S.
37, 44 (1983)).
52. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1408.
53. 460 U.S. 37, 46 (1983).
54. See supra notes 48-55 and accompanying text.
55. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1408-09.
56. Id. at 1408. The court distinguished Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent, 104
S. Ct. 2118 (1984), in which a municipal ordinance prohibiting posting of campaign signs on
telephone poles was held not to violate the first amendement right of access to a public forum.
Id. The court further quoted the Supreme Court in Grayned v. City of Rockford, 408 U.S.
104, (1972). "Public property . . . which is neither a traditional nor a designated public
forum, can still serve as a forum for first amendment expression if the expression is appropriate
for the property . . . and is not incompatible with the normal activity of a particular place
at a particular time." Grayned v. City of Rockford, id. at 116. The court in Preferred Com-
munications held the suspending of cable to be compatible with the normal use of utility
structures, although the posting of political campaign signs was incompatible with nor-
mal use. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1408. See infra notes 72-79 and accompa-
nying text. The court further acknowledged the position of PCI that public utility facilities
constitute a kind of forum by designation. The assertion was supported by state legislation
declaring that the use of surplus utility pole space for cable television was in the public interest
and by the existence of the cable television franchising process. Preferred Communications,
754 F.2d at 1409. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
57. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1408.
58. Id. at 1409.
59. Id. Joint briefs amici curiae were filed by the cities of Palo Alto, Menlo Park, and
the Town of Atherton in support of Los Angeles. Id. at 1399 n.2. Amici asserted that
the right to shared access to the franchise of another cable company was an adequate substitute
for the granting of another franchise. Id. at 1410. The court disagreed, however, and found
that sharing cable channels with other companies would diminish the first amendment rights
of PCI. Id. The court analogized the assertion of amici to a hypothetical ordinance that would
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II. LEGAL BACKGROUND
A. Access to Public Forums
The United States Supreme Court held in United States Postal Ser-
vice v. Council of Greenburgh Civic Association" that the first amend-
ment does not guarantee access to property merely because that prop-
erty is owned or controlled by the government. 61 Access is determined
by the degree of compatibility of the character of the property with
the proposed use for first amendment expression.62 The Supreme Court,
in Perry Education Association v. Perry Local Educators' Associa-
tion,63 identified three types of public property that may serve as public
forums." First, property such as streets and parks that have been
devoted to public assembly and debate by long tradition or govern-
ment designation are public forums.65 Next, property such as schools
and community centers that the government occasionally opens to the
public may be used for expressive activity.66 Finally, property such
as mail boxes, rapid transit cars, and jailhouses are public property
not designated as public forums by tradition or designation, and may
be used for first amendment expression only in limited circumstances.'6
All three categories are subject to content neutral6" regulations of the
time, place and manner of expression that are narrowly tailored to
serve a significant government interest.6 9 The third category, however,
is subject to further regulation.
The government may reserve a nontraditional forum for an originally
intended purpose0 if the regulation is reasonable and does not regulate
allow free expression in public parks for only a few minutes at six a.m, The permitted access
would fail to adequately provide a replacement for free debate in that forum. Id. at 1409-10.
60. 453 U.S. 114 (1981).
61. Id. at 129.
62. Perry, 460 U.S. at 44.
63. 460 U.S. 37 (1983).
64. Id. at 45-46.
65. Id. at 45; see Hague v. CIO, 307 U.S. 486, 515 (1939) (streets and parks have been
traditionally used for purposes of assembly, debates, and discussion of public questions),
66. Perry, 460 U.S. at 45; see, e.g., Widmar v. Vincent, 454 U.S. 263 (1981) (university
meeting places opened for use by student groups).
67. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46; United States Postal Service, 453 U.S. at 131 n.7 (mailboxes).
See Lehman v. Shaker Heights, 418 U.S. 298, 304 (1974) (rapid transit cars); Adderley v. Florida,
385 U.S. 39, 4748 (1966) (jailhouses).
68. Government regulation of editorial content of first amendment expression is permissi-
ble only if necessary, and narrowly drawn to serve a compelling state interest. Perry, 460 U.S.
at 45.
69. Id. 460 U.S. at 46.
70. For example, mail boxes may be reserved for delivery of mail (Perry, 460 U,S, at
46), rapid transit cars for carrying passengers (see Lehman, 418 U.S. at 303-04), and jailhouses
for security of prisoners (Adderley, 385 U.S. at 47-48).
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expressive content.71 In Members of the City Council of the City of
Los Angeles v. Taxpayers for Vincent,72 the Supreme Court held that
utility poles and conduits are not public forums by tradition.71 Because
PCI sought first amendment access to utility poles, the court in Prefer-
red Communications applied the regulatory standard of the nontradi-
tional forum.7"
In Vincent, the Court found that the posting of political campaign
signs was incompatible with the intended use of the poles. 7 The Court
recognized a significant government interest in the aesthetic appearance
of the public property at issue. 6 Government regulation was permitted
because the ordinance in question was narrowly drawn and the ob-
jective was not to control expressive content. 77 The court in Prefer-
red Communications, however, distinguished Vincent on the facts. The
attachment of television cables to telephone poles proposed by PCI
was not analogous to the posting of political campaign signs in Vin-
cent.78 The suspension of television cables, unlike the posting of
political campaign signs, was consistent with the use of public utility
poles to support telephone and power lines."
In Preferred Communications, the court found that utility struc-
tures could be classed as a nontraditional forum under Vincent, and
further addressed the possibility that utility poles are designated public
forums according to local legislation.8" The California Legislature
declared that use of surplus space on utility structures by the cable
television industry is in the public interest."' In addition, the designa-
tion of utility poles as a public forum was evidenced by the franchis-
ing process of the City of Los Angeles that recognized the use of
utility structures by cable television as appropriate.82 Classification
of utility structures as traditional or designated public forums limits
the regulatory scope of the city to reasonable time, place and manner
controls only. 3 In Preferred Communications, the court applied the
71. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
72. 104 S. Ct. 2118 (1984).
73. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2118.
74. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1408.
75. Vincent, 104 S. Ct. at 2118.
76. Id. at 2130.
77. See id. at 2130-32 (visual assault on citizens by the accumulation of signs posted on
public property constituted a substantive evil within the power of the city to prohibit).
78. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1408.
79. Id.
80. Id. at 1409.
81. See supra note 13 and accompanying text.
82. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1409.
83. See supra notes 64-68 and accompanying text.
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standard of reasonable time, place and manner regulation to the cable
franchise process used by the city.
B. Time, Place and Manner Regulation of Free Expression
The first amendment permits governmental regulation of the time,
place and manner of speech.84 The test for assessing the government
regulation of time, place and manner of expression is reasonableness.8"
Incidental restrictions on the freedom of expression no greater than
essential to the furtherance of a substantial governmental interest are
permissible. 6 In Preferred Communications, however, the City of Los
Angeles advanced only a limited governmental interest. The govern-
mental interest asserted by the city was control of the inherent burden
that the cable television medium places on the public domain. 7 The
cable television medium causes a significant disruption of streets and
utility structures during installation.88 The franchise process, on the
other hand, created a serious risk that city officials would discriminate
among cable operators on the basis of content.89 The court in Preferred
Communications concluded that the franchise process was unreasonable
because the interest in preventing disruption of public property did
not outweigh the impact of the franchising process on first amend-
ment freedoms. 90 Beyond an interest in protecting the public domain,
the City of Los Angeles argued7 for regulation of cable television fran-
chises under the same standards used for regulating television broad-
casting companies.9'
C. The Physical Scarcity Doctrine
The government enjoys a greater latitude in regulating the broad-
cast medium than other media because of the physical scarcity of radio
waves.9" The electromagnetic spectrum used for television broadcasting
is incapable of accommodating the messages of all who wish to use
the medium. 93 The same standard applied to regulation of the televi-
84. Home Box Office, Inc. v. FCC, 567 F.2d 9, 47 (D.C. Cir. 1977), cert denied, 434
U.S. 829 (1977); see Metromedia, Inc. v. City of San Diego, 453 U.S. 490, 502 (1981).
85. See O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
86. Id.
87. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1405-07.
88. Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1377.
89. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 1403-04.
92. Century Federal, Inc. v. City of Palo Alto, 579 F. Supp. 1553, 1563 (N.D. Cal. 1984).
93. Id.
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sion broadcast industry, however, does not apply to all media of com-
munication. 94
The United States Supreme Court stated in Southeastern Promo-
tions, Ltd. v. Conrad5 that each mode of expression must be assessed
for first amendment purposes by standards suited to that medium. 96
Although the physical scarcity doctrine of broadcasting was applied
in one case regarding regulation of cable television, 97 the court in
Preferred Communications distinguished the two media, noting that
cable television access is not limited by the electromagnetic spectrum. 98
In terms of physical scarcity, the limited spectrum of radio waves
could be analogized to the scarcity of space on utility poles and con-
duits. The City of Los Angeles, however, could not use the doctrine
to limit access to a single cable operator without asserting a physical
scarcity. 99 The city failed to determine the extent of any physical limita-
tion on the use of public utility structures.10 PCI alleged that enough
physical space existed to accommodate more than one cable fran-
chise.' 0' Under the facts of Preferred Communications, the physical
scarcity doctrine, therefore, was not a valid basis for limiting cable
franchises to a single company.
The court in Preferred Communications found that the applicable
legal doctrines did not permit the City of Los Angeles to limit access
to public utility structures to a single cable television company.'0 2 The
methods employed by the city to regulate first amendment rights of
access to a public forum were found impermissible because the use
proposed by PCI was not incompatible with the purpose of utility
poles to support cables.' 3 Time, place and manner regulations that
allowed only a single cable operator were unreasonable because the
interest in controlling disruption of public property was outweighed
by the risk that the city would discriminate among cable companies
on the basis of editorial content.' 4 Finally, the physical scarcity doc-
94. Southeastern Promotions, Ltd. v. Conrad, 420 U.S. 546, 557 (1975).
95. 420 U.S. 546 (1975).
96. Id. at 557.
97. See Black Hills Video Corp. v. FCC, 399 F.2d 65, 69 (8th Cir. 1968).
98. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404, (quoting Omega Satellite Products, Co.
v. City of Indianapolis, 694 F.2d 119 ,-1 2 7 (1982)) ("[Frequency interference [is] a problem
that does not arise with cable televisioi.").
99. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1404.
100. Id.
101. Id. See supra note 5 and accompanying text.
102. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1411.
103. Id. at 1408.
104. Id. at 1406.
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trine did not justify limitation of franchises to a single company
because PCI alleged the availability of utility pole space for more
than a single franchise."'
III. LEGAL RAMIFICATIONS
The holding in Preferred Communications suggests the government
must allow more than a single cable television franchise to operate
in a geographical region when the cables can be physically accom-
modated. °6 Not all government regulation, however, violates first
amendment rights. A question remains regarding the criteria the govern-
ment might use to limit the number of franchises.
In Preferred Communications, the court linked first amendment
rights of access to the availability of space on public utility struc-
tures. The extent of the relationship between access and availability
can be addressed in at least three ways. First, cities can determine
the maximum number of cable franchises that would be compatible
with the normal activity typical of utility structures." 7 Next, cities
can declare and reserve space required for delivery of electrical power
and telephone services.' 08 Finally, cities may assert substantial govern-
ment interests that require a limit on the number of cable franchises.' 0
An examination of these alternatives will help define the scope of
the holding in Preferred Communications.
A. Incompatibility With Normal Activity
The court in Preferred Communications distinguished Vincent on
the facts. ' 0 In Vincent, the use of utility structures for posting political
campaign signs was incompatible with the normal use of those
facilities."' In contrast, the use proposed by PCI did reflect the nor-
mal use of utility poles as support structures for telephone and power
lines."' The number of cable television franchises, however, could
be limited consistent with the holding in Preferred Communications.
Cities that determine the maximum number of franchises that can
be accommodated by existing utility structures could justify the
105. Id. at 1404.
106. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1411.
107. See supra notes 60-79 and accompanying text.
108. Id.
109. See supra notes 84-91 and accompanying text.
110. See Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1408-09.
111. See id.
112. Id. at 1408. See supra note 56 and accompanying text.
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exclusion of additional cable companies. The limitation would be
justified if additional cables would abnormally burden the structures.
B. Space Required for Electrical and Telephone Services
In addition to the doctrine of abnormal use, a city may limit use
of a forum to purposes compatible with the intended use of that
forum." 3 The court in Preferred Communications relied heavily on
the three-part classification of public property set forth by the Supreme
Court in Perry."4 If utility structures are a nontraditional forum, the
government can reserve the forum for originally intended purposes
if the regulation is reasonable and not an attempt to regulate con-
tent." 5 A city could reserve space on public utility structures for the
intended use as support for electrical power and telephone equip-
ment. "6 The allocation of cable television franchises could, therefore,
be limited to the number of franchises that can be accommodated
by remaining space. Space remaining after reservation for utility pur-
poses may allow accommodation of only a single cable company."'
C. Competing Substantial Interests
Government regulation of the time, place and manner of speech
is permissible if the restriction is no greater than necessary to further
an important or substantial governmental interest." 8 Under the facts
of Preferred Communications, limiting cable television franchises to
a single company was too great a restriction. Although the delivery
of cable television to consumers requires the use of public property," 19
the interest of protecting public property did not outweigh the risk
that diversity of editorial expression would be limited. 2 The limita-
tion of cable television franchises to a single company, therefore, was
deemed excessive.' 2'
113. Perry, 460 U.S. at 46.
114. Id. at 45-46.
115. See supra notes 62-71 and accompanying text.
116. Id.
117. In Perry, the Supreme Court held that a state could ban use of a school mail system
by a rival teachers' union. Perry, 460 U.S. at 37. A state could reserve use of the school
mail system for the intended purpose of official school communication. Id. The holding in
Perry would seem to support reserving utility pole space that is necessary for the intended
use of utility poles as support for telephone and electrical power lines. See id. at 46.
118. O'Brien, 391 U.S. at 377.
119. Id.; see Community Communications, 660 F.2d at 1377-78 (government may control
the time and frequency of street excavations required for laying television cables).
120. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406.
121. Preferred Communications, 754 F.2d at 1406-07.
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Following the rationale of the court, a city could impose a fran-
chise limit in the interest of protecting the public property. Limita-
tion to a single cable company, however, remains outside the scope
of permissible regulation due to the editorial diversity mandated by
the first amendment. 2 A city may, however, advance interests other
than protection of public property. Courts have permitted narrowly
tailored regulation of free speech activity in public forums in the in-
terest of public safety.'23 If a city demonstrates that an excessive
number of cable franchises endangers the public, the interest in public
safety would outweigh the first amendment interest in presenting diverse
editorial viewpoints."' Although the court in Preferred Communica-
tions struck down an attempt to allow only a single cable company
to operate in a designated geographical region, the ruling does not
preclude limitation to a single franchise in all circumstances.
CONCLUSION
In Preferred Communications, the court held that a city could not
limit access of cable television companies to a single franchise if public
utility structures could physically accommodate more. A question re-
mains regarding the scope of regulatory power a city can assert to
limit the number of franchises. The court in Preferred Communica-
tions suggested that a city may determine the ability of public utility
structures to physically accommodate television cables by considering
three factors: (1) Compatibility with normal use of utility poles and
conduits; (2) preservation of space for the intended purposes of elec-
trical power and telephone service delivery; and (3) countervailing
substantial government interests.
122. See id.
123. Courts have permitted narrowly tailored regulation of public forum access to advance
public safety interests. See, e.g., Knolls Action Project v. Knolls Atomic Power Laboratory,
771 F.2d 46 (2nd Cir. 1985) (reasonable safety concerns warranted denial of permission for
activists to leaflet government owned nuclear research facility); Fantasy Book Shop, Inc. v.
City of Boston, 652 F.2d 1115 (Mass. Cir. 1981) (safety problems arising from increased pedestrian
traffic permitted denial of amusement license); Friedrich v. City of Chicago, - F. Supp.
(D. Il. 1985) (safety hazards created by increased pedestrian traffic and gathering of crowds
justified banning break dancers); Acorn v. City of Phoenix, 603 F. Supp. 869 (D. Ariz. 1985)
(safety and traffic considerations permit prohibition of approaching and soliciting drivers of
cars stopped at intersections); International Society for Krishna Consciousness, Inc. v. New
Jersey Sports and Exposition Authority, 532 F. Supp. 1088 (D. N.J. 1981) (strong considera-
tions for safety warranted banning solicitation by religious organization at race track due to
presence and exposure of cash possessed by large numbers of people).
124. A city might, for example, assert an overriding concern for dangers imposed by in-
stalling cables in areas exposed to high winds or other hazardous conditions. See supra note
123 and accompanying text.
1986 / Preferred Communications, Inc. v. City of L.A.
Disruption of the public domain is not a sufficient government in-
terest to justify limiting access to a single cable television company.
The ruling in Preferred Communications is sufficiently narrow,
however, to permit limitation to a single company in certain cir-
cumstances. If more than one franchise would constitute excessive
use of utility poles, Vincent might allow limitation of access to a single
franchise. The ruling of the Supreme Court in Perry, giving priority
to the originally intended use of a nontraditional public forum, would
permit a city to limit access to a single cable television company if
necessary to preserve the intended use of utility poles for delivery
of electrical power and telephone services. Finally, government con-
cerns for safety might also justify restricting access to a single com-
pany if that interest outweighed first amendment concerns.
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